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ABSTRACT
Technology Usage to Manage Client Growth: Understanding Robo-Advisor Adoption Among
Registered Investment Firms
by
Kevin B. Chalk
April 2021
Chair: Vikas Agarwal
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of fee discounts offered by
Registered Investment Advisors (RIA) on the adoption of a robo-advisor solution by their clients
within a hybrid investment services model. The analysis of fee discounts within the RIA model is
based on assets under management, those less than $250 million and those above $250 million.
In addition to analyzing fee discounts offered by an RIA, this study looks at the characteristics of
clients using an RIA that has adopted a robo-solution. The findings suggest that RIA firms over
$250 million, that offer a fee discount on a robo-solution, are likely to have higher adoption rates
than smaller RIA firms. This study also finds that younger clients and clients with lesser
investment knowledge have higher adoption of robo-solution offered by the RIA.
INDEX WORDS: Robo-Advisor, Robo-Advising, Registered Investment Advisor, Registered
Investment Advisors, Fintech, Wealth Management Technology
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I

INTRODUCTION

There have been a few technologies that have been introduced in the financial services
sector in recent years. Referring to the financial industry, Alt et. al (2018) state that an industry
had remained rather stable over decades was apparently confronted suddenly with new market
participants and the acceleration of digital innovation. This digital innovation has included the
onset of technologies geared to managing investment portfolios, specifically the rise of
automated investment solutions which is synonymous with the term, robo-advisor. Jung et. al
(2017) references work by Maedche et. al (2016), Sironi (2016), and Ludden et. al. (2015) to
define robo-advisors as digital platforms comprising interactive and intelligent user assistance
components that use information technology to guide customers through an automated
(investment) advisory process. Much of the current literature has focused on the performance
aspects of robo-advisors as it relates to portfolio construction and asset allocation methods
(D’Acunto et. al., 2019, Beketov et. al., 2018), predictive modeling (Gu et. al., 2019), household
balance sheet and personal finance choices (D’Acunto and Rossi, 2021) or comparing roboadvisors vs. traditional investment advisors (Uhl and Rohner, 2018, Harrison and Samaddar,
2020). There is little research addressing the revenue implications of adopting a robo-advisor
solution within a financial services organization that offers traditional wealth management
services. Traditional wealth managers have viewed robo-advisors as competition, as they are
typically offered at lower costs, and not as a solution that can be complementary to the existing
services they provide. Robo-advisors can assist firms in the overall client experience for certain
clients of the firm. As a segment of the fintech trend, robos have broadened the means of
delivering financial advice (Fan and Chatterjee, 2020). An increasing body of research suggests
that the future of the financial planning industry lies in a hybrid approach which combines a
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robo-advisor with the traditional wealth management offering (Sarpong, 2020; Thompson, 2018;
Lopez et. al., 2015; Kitces et. al, 2015; Stich, 2018).
The existing research that relates to the hybrid model focuses mainly on the theoretical
concepts of integrating a robo-advisor such as, pricing strategies (Ludden et. al., 2015; Edwards,
2018; Garmhausen, 2015; Woodyard and Grable, 2018) and cannibalization of existing business
(Lopez et. al., 2015). The tension that exists in wealth management firms choosing to offer a
robo-advisor to their clients lies in the notion that adopting a robo-solution could potentially
address capacity constraints, which comes with a growing client base, but also potentially
cannibalize higher revenue streams of business. A robo-advisor can be utilized by investors
without the assistance of a financial advisor. Wealthfront, Betterment, and Sig-Fig are examples
of firms that offer a robo-advisor at annual fees ranging from zero to 0.25%.1 Additionally,
wealth managers that utilize a custodial platform such as Charles Schwab, Fidelity, or TD
Ameritrade (which are known as custodians), have access to a customizable robo-advisor that is
offered by the custodian. For examples of wealth managers, RIA Channel.com2 ranks the top 100
wealth managers of 2020 based on size, growth, and quality. Creative Planning, Plante Moran
and Wealth Enhancement Advisors are ranked as the top three wealth managers with assets
under management of $45B, $17B and $13B, respectively. Wealth managers with assets under
management of $100M or more are required to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and file a Form ADV and a 13F filing. These filings can be found on the
SEC website at www.sec.gov.

1
2

https://www.businessinsider.com/best-robo-advisors
https://www.riachannel.com/top-100-wealth-manager-list-2020/
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The question that arises, for wealth management firms that choose to offer a roboadvisor, as part of their offering, is do they price the robo-solution at 0.25%? In doing so, would
this potentially cause clients that are being charged a traditional wealth management fee structure
(roughly 1%) to want to be in a lower priced investment solution that is offered by their advisor?
This study will add to the current literature by proposing a framework to understand
robo-advisor adoption of investors, through the lens of wealth management firms. Specifically,
this study aims to address the following research question: For assets managed by an RIA, are
fee discounts associated with higher allocation of client assets to an automated investment
solution versus a traditional solution?
RIABiz, an online journal that targets the financial services industry states “In simple
terms, an RIA is a registered investment adviser. This generally means a financial firm that
engages in advising others about investing in securities, gets paid for it and is subject to
oversight by the SEC or their equivalent regulator at the state level. A confusing factor is that
people often believe that the term “RIA” applies to an individual that works for the advisory
firm. However, this is inaccurate. Individuals who provide advice on behalf of the firm are
referred to as investment adviser representatives. It’s the firm itself that is called an RIA”.3 For
the purpose of this study, RIA will be used to refer to the firm.
RIAs have outpaced traditional broker dealers such as Merrill Lynch, UBS, Morgan
Stanley, in terms of asset market share. A 2019 Investment News Report4 stated “in the financial
advice industry, money and margins are moving slowly and inexorably away from the bankowned wirehouses to independent registered investment advisers, along with other business
models that either pay more or give advisers equity in their practices.” Cerulli Associates, in

3
4

https://riabiz.com/a/2011/10/4/what-exactly-is-an-ria.
https://www.investmentnews.com/wall-street-is-going-ria-ish-80224.
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their U.S. RIA Marketplace 2019 report5, state “RIAs are expected to control a combined 29.6%
of industry asset market share by year-end 2023.” The report further states, “from a percentagepoint perspective, hybrids and independent RIAs are expected to increase 3.5 and 2.0 points,
respectively, versus the wirehouses’ –4.8 points”. With this growth comes capacity constraints.
The typical RIA firm starts out by bringing on any client they can, regardless of asset size. This
strategy is the way most firms survive in the early years, serve whomever they can. After 10 or
15 years in business, an RIA firm might have amassed hundreds of clients and will have a
heavily concentrated number of smaller clients that generate a very small amount of revenue.
The capacity constraint issue is one that all wealth management firms must wrestle with and is an
important issue to address, otherwise firm growth could stall. Michael Kitces, former practitioner
editor of the Journal of Financial Planning and frequent contributor to RIA industry
publications, states in reference to an Investment News benchmarking study, the average advisor
(which includes both lead, service, and support advisors working with clients) was responsible
for 57 clients, and $477,000 of revenue in 2017. By contrast, back in 2013, the average advisor’s
productivity was 73 clients and $561,000 of revenue. In other words, despite the rise of more
advanced technology tools to support advisory firm efficiency, the number of clients that an
advisor supports dropped by nearly 22%, and the associated revenue/advisor dropped 15%, likely
buoyed by the fact that the client’s portfolio and AUM fees themselves grew over this time
period, thanks to market returns, and partially ameliorated the 22% decline in clients/advisor
(Kitces, 2018). To shed light on how an RIA firm might utilize a robo-advisor to address
capacity constraints, this study will focus on the characteristics of investors using an RIA, for
financial services, that have adopted a robo-solution.

5

The Cerulli Report, U.S. RIA Marketplace 2019.
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The importance of this study can be gauged from a 2020 benchmarking survey6 of 1010
RIAs (survey done by Charles Schwab Advisor Services) which lists improving productivity
with new technology, improving satisfaction for existing clients, and increasing firm capacity as
three of the top seven strategic initiatives. Figure 1 highlights the findings from the study. The
top two initiatives are growing via client and center of influence referrals. RIAs are clearly
focused on growing their businesses’; however, capacity is becoming an increasing issue. The
traditional way to manage capacity is to hire more staff, which is a costly solution. RIAs, that
want to continue to grow, must find a way to embrace technology to help alleviate capacity
constraints to continue to maintain their growth trajectory.

Figure 1: Top Strategic Initiatives
Schwab’s 2020 benchmarking survey expanded questions, as it relates to standardizing
procedures and increasing use of technology in managing clients, to include RIAs focused on
using automated investment solutions. Of the 1,010 participants, only 19% said they are
currently using or plan to use an automated investment solution in the next 12 months. Citywire,

6

https://content.schwab.com/web/retail/public/about-schwab/schwab_ria_benchmmarking_study_2020_0720-0WBV.pdf
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a news resource targeted at RIAs, stated in a December 2019 article7 “While digital advice has
made gains in recent years with investors, particularly smaller and younger investors, industry
experts say adoption of the technology by advisors remains nascent. Actual use cases for roboadvisors at RIAs are still largely experimental – or very niche. Through my own interactions
with RIAs, as a relationship manager for over 16 years to the RIA market, the main concern that
some RIAs have with robo-advisors is the potential need to lower their fees for offering services
that are traditionally delivered in a more traditional face-to-face setting. The notion of having to
lower fees poses a threat to revenue, however, by not implementing some form of technology to
assist in managing client growth, there is a threat to overall client growth in the form of firm
inefficiencies. In addition to a low adoption rate, as previously noted in the 2019 Charles Schwab
benchmarking study, RIAs still potentially see the robo-advisor as an external threat. Research
done in January 2019 by Statista, shows 45% of RIAs are concerned robo-advisors pose a threat
to their firm.8 While the Statista research highlights the perceived threat of robo-advisors to RIAs
externally, those RIAs that have adopted a robo-solution within their firm grapple with how to
charge for such a solution vs. their traditional services that are delivered face to face. The first
contribution this study will make is to examine the effects of an RIA offering fee discounts as it
relates to the adoption rate of a robo-solution.
The decision to adopt a robo-advisor is twofold: the first being that the RIA choses to
adopt and offer such a solution to their clients, and secondly that the client accepts the proposed
solution by the RIA. It is important to note that in the RIA model, while the firm typically has
discretion when it comes to investment decisions, in most cases a product offering like a robo-

7

https://citywireusa.com/registered-investment-advisor/news/why-are-rias-shying-away-from-roboadvisors/a1295712
8

https://www.statista.com/statistics/533278/level-of-concern-about-robo-advisors-posing-threat-to-us-ria/.

7

advisor would involve the client in making that choice. This implies there are two units of
analysis that should be considered in the research question. The firm, which this study will
explore from a fee perspective as previously mentioned but secondly from the individual
perspective as the client can ultimately choose to proceed with having their assets managed by a
robo-solution with the RIA or not.
There is limited research to date that has investigated FinTech adoption (D’Acunto et. al.,
2019) or robo-advisor adoption behavior (Fan and Chatterjee, 2020). The existing literature
focuses exclusively on the retail consumer and the characteristics of those consumers.
Woodyard and Grable (2018) address the typical profile of the users of robo technology. They
validate that the typical user is under age 35, is technologically savvy and confident in their
decision-making abilities. Additionally, Charlotte Beyer (Beyer 2017) addresses the shifts in
wealth management due to the younger generation and trends in technology. Like the work by
Woodyard and Grable, Beyer discusses how wealth is getting younger and the value propositions
of financial advisors are changing. There is a view that millennials are much more likely to adopt
the use of technology in all facets of their lives to include their finances (Cutler 2015,
Kirchenbauer and Jones, 2018). The millennial age group tends to be more educated, are willing
to do their own research and tend to be less trusting of financial service professionals (Cutler,
2015). Additionally, millennials carry more debt (result from educational spending) and
therefore have smaller asset amounts to invest. These reasons make the robo solutions ideal for
millennials according to the literature reviewed. Fulk et. al (2018) find that robo-advisor users
generally (1) had lower income, (2) had lower net worth, (3) had received no or less inheritance,
and (4) were less impulsive financially. The second contribution this study will make is to
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extend the research done on retail adoption of robo-advisors to that of investors that are using an
RIA for financial guidance.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section II presents the hypothesis
development. Section III describes the methods used in the study along with a description of the
data, summary statistics for key variables, and analysis of the results. Section IV is a discussion
of the results, and Section V concludes with the limitations of the study along with
recommendations for future research.

9

II

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Although existing literature provides insights into the individual investor behavior as it
relates to robo-advisors, to the best of my knowledge, there is little work on the adoption of
robo-solutions related to the RIA industry. As noted earlier, the decision to adopt a robo-advisor
is twofold: first that the RIA choses to adopt and offers a robo-solution to their clients, and
second that the client accepts the RIA’s proposed solution. The first set of hypotheses explores
the relationship of the adoption rate of a robo-solution and RIA discretionary AUM along with
offering fee discounts for the robo-solution. The motivation for this set of hypotheses (H1a-H1c)
is that fee discounts for a robo-solution are related to adoption rates by clients, specifically for
smaller RIAs (up to $250M). Firms with AUM under $250M have a median total staff of 4
serving 132 clients while firms over $250M have a median total staff of 12, serving 389 clients.9
New client acquisition, client service, firm management, investment management, compliance,
and operations are among some of the firm activities that all firms face, smaller firms often must
“outsource” some of these firm activities.
Building on the work done by Adam Smith (1965) on the division on labor among workers,
Becker and Murphy (1992) state a worker who does not specialize and performs all tasks
allocates their time among tasks to maximize common output. Kumar et al. (2019) states
individual employee’s specialization is in proportion to the size of the firm. Firms under $250M
often do not have specialized roles relating to investment management and if a robo-solution is
being used, this study hypothesizes (H1d) that there is an association between the percentage of
employees performing the investment advisory role and the adoption rate of a robo-solution.

9

https://content.schwab.com/web/retail/public/about-schwab/schwab_ria_benchmmarking_study_2020_0720-0WBV.pdf

10

Smaller firms could lean more on the efficiencies and scale the robo-solution offers than larger
firms.
Cyert and March (1963) state that prices are often set on conventional practice. As a
consultant to the RIA industry, I have noted numerous conversations where RIA firms are likely
to discount the fee for the robo-offer versus traditional services. This is a tension that can exist
across RIA firms. Figure 2 highlights the fees of the top 10 robo-advisors according to Ignites, a
source for news regarding the mutual fund industry. With the exposure in the popular press that
robo-advisors are receiving, RIA firms tend to use the marketplace as the “conventional” pricing
standard in order to avoid competing on price, which could potentially drive better adoption of
the robo-solution.

11

Figure 2: Fees Charged by Top Robo-Advisors

The first set of hypotheses are stated as follows:
H1a. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with an RIA firm’s
discretionary assets under management (AUM).
H1b. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with RIA firms that
offer a fee discount on the robo-solution.
H1c. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with the interaction
of RIA firm AUM and offering a fee discount on the robo-solution.
H1d. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with the percentage
of employees performing investment advisory functions within RIA firm.
The second set of hypotheses relates to the characteristics of investors that adopt a robosolution. This study hypothesizes that age along with other investor traits can influence the
adoption rate of a technological solution such as a robo-advisor. The motivation for these
hypotheses comes from the Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 1995) which is used in
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explaining how an idea or product gains traction and spreads (diffuses) through a group or social
system. Mahajan et. al (1990) state that the purpose of the diffusion model is to predict the
successive increases in the number of adopters.
Rogers offers some socioeconomic and personality characteristics of early adopters that can
be used to help develop a profile of the typical RIA client that might be willing to adopt a robosolution. Rogers states: a) “early adopters have a greater rationality than later adopters.
Rationality in this sense is defined as the most effective means to reach a given end; b) earlier
adopters are not different from later adopters in age. There is inconsistent evidence about the
relationship of age and innovativeness; and c) earlier adopters have a greater ability to deal with
abstractions than do later adopters. Innovators must be able to adopt a new idea largely on the
basis of rather abstract stimuli.” While the research from Rogers is inconclusive as it relates to
age and technological adoption, there have been several studies that have used the Diffusion of
Innovation Theory to hypothesize age relating to technological adoption (Baldrige and Burnham,
1975; Gora, 2020; Robertson, Zielinski, and Ward, 1984 quoted in Gatignon and Robertson,
1985) and recently Fan and Chatterjee (2020) used Diffusion of Innovation theory in their study
of robo-advisor utilization for individual investors. Also, practitioner literature makes the claim
that robo-adopters are younger (Huxlex and Kim, 2016; Cutler, 2015; AT Kearney Report, 2015;
Munk, 2005; Woodyard and Grable, 2018; Fulk et. al., 2018; Lourenço et. al., 2020). In addition
to the previous research on age relating to technology adoption, this study extends the profile of
robo-adopters to include investment goals (Lourenço et. al., 2020; Agnew and Mitchell, 2018),
active vs. passive investors, investment knowledge (Fulk et. al., 2018; AT Kearney Report,
2015) and experience with market corrections. This background leads to the second set of
hypotheses:
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H2a. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with an
investor’s goals.
H2b. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with an
investor’s actions (or proposed actions) during a market correction.
H2c. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with an
investor’s age.
H2d. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with an
investor’s knowledge.
H2e. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with an
investor’s experience with a market correction.
H2f. The percentage of assets allocated to a robo-solution is associated with account
ownership and account taxability.
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III METHODS
III.1 Data
This paper used data from a brokerage firm that provides asset custody to RIAs.
This brokerage firm has built a customizable robo-solution for their RIA clients to use. This
robo-solution is completely customizable by the RIA to incorporate over 1,300 ETFs or 2,700
mutual funds that are chosen by the RIA. The brokerage firm has no oversight or input into the
investment allocation of the models built within the robo-advisor. The only caveat that the RIA
firm must adhere to is a cash allocation requirement for the models they build. Currently, the
brokerage firm does not charge a fee for the RIA to use the robo-solution.
A data file was created that consisted of all RIA firms that are currently using the
brokerage firm’s robo-solution, along with the clients that are linked to each RIA firm where the
RIA firm has employed the robo-solution to manage the client’s assets. The data file was created
according to the brokerage firms’ approach to serving RIAs based on AUM. Table 1 summarizes
the data from the brokerage firm. To maintain the confidentiality of the brokerage firm’s service
model, the classification was changed to Service Model 1, Service Model 2, and Service Model
3.
Table 1: Population Descriptives
RIA Service Model

RIA Firms in
Population Set

Clients in
Population Set

Client Percentage
of overall
Population

Service Model 1

182

2,888

16%

Service Model 2

365

12,187

68%

Service Model 3

101

2,803

16%

Total

648

17,878

100%
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A sample set for this study was created as the data file mentioned above did not include
all the variables needed for the study (the brokerage firm uses multiple databases that contain the
information needed for this study), therefore a second sample data set was created. A sample set
of 1,000 client accounts was chosen based on suggestion in Burns and Burns (2008) to use a
relationship between effect size and power to determine the sample size. Table 2 and Table 3
from Burns and Burns (2008) highlight the proposed relationships. Table 2 in Burns and Burns
(2008) notes that large N (sample size) is a factor for increasing power in a statistical test.
Additionally, to detect small effect sizes at a significance level of 5%, a sample size of 1,000 is
needed.
Table 2: Factors That Influence Power

Table 3: Same Sizes

As it relates to this study, a simple percentage weighting method was used to determine
the number of clients to sample from each service model in Table 1. For example, Service
Models 1 and 2 have 16% of the overall clients in the population set, Service Model 2 has 68%
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of the overall population set. Using a target of 1,000 clients, a sample of 160 clients was
collected from Service Models 1 and 3, and 680 clients from Service Model 2. To collect the
sample, a simple random sampling technique was used (Trochim et. al, 2016) where the
population data was loaded into excel for each service model and then all client identifiers were
removed (to protect client confidentiality) and a random number was assigned by excel to each
client. The random number assignment was then sorted from lowest to highest and the first 160
clients were taken from Service Models 1 and 3 and the first 680 clients were taken from Service
Model 2. Table 4 highlights the variables, along with a definition of each variable, which was
collected from the client level along with their associated RIA-level variables.
Table 4: Variable Descriptives
RIA-Level Variable
Variable Definition
RIA assets in robosolution

The variables below
were collected from a
database independent of
the brokerage firm
(www.sec.gov)

RIA discretionary assets

RIA-Level Variable
Fee discounts offered on
robo-solution

Percentage of Employees
Performing Investment
Advisory Function

Client-Level Variable Variable Definition

Total amount of assets
that the RIA manages for
their clients using the
brokerage firm’s robosolution.
RIA Firms must file a
form ADV, with the SEC
or State (depending on
AUM). Each RIA that
uses the brokerage firms
robo-solution discloses its
use on their ADV as well
as their total amount of
assets under management
for the entire firm.
Amount of assets under
management, of the RIA,
that is under the
discretionary control of
the firm

Age

Age of the client

Total assets with RIA

The total amount of assets
the client has placed with
the RIA

Total assets in robosolution

The total amount of assets
that are in the robosolution that is linked to
the RIA

Variable Definition

Client-Level Variable

Variable Definition

RIA discloses any fee
discounts that are
different from their
“regular” fee schedule.
The RIA reports the total
number of employees
performing the investment
advisory functions and the
total number of
employees overall.

Percentage of assets in
robo-solution

Stated investment goal

Represents total assets in
the robo-solution divided
by the total assets with
the RIA
When clients enroll in the
robo-solution, they
choose their intended
investment goal which
could be one of the
following: prepare for

17

Investment Knowledge

Experienced a market
decline of 20% or more
(Yes or No)

Action Taken During
Market Decline

Account Registration

Taxable or Non-Taxable

retirement, build long
term wealth, generate
income, save for
something special, build a
rainy-day fund or save for
an upcoming expense
When clients enroll in the
robo-solution they choose
their investment
knowledge which could
be one of the following:
none, some, good or
extensive
When clients enroll in the
robo-solution they
indicate (yes or no) if
they have ever
experienced a market
decline of 20% or more.
When clients enroll in the
robo-solution and they
answer “yes” to having
experienced a market
decline of 20% or more,
they choose from the
following regarding
action they took: did
nothing, bought more,
reallocated my
investment, sold
everything or sold some.
If the client answered no,
they were asked what
they would likely do from
the following options: do
nothing, buy more;
reallocate my
investments, sell
everything, sell some
Joint, Individual,
Custodial or IRA
From the registration
label, a variable was
created to indicate if the
account was taxable or
non-taxable.

I decided that the service model classification, for RIAs, by the brokerage firm would not
create results that could be generalized (Trochim et. al, 2016) therefore the RIA firms were
broken into categories based on discretionary AUM. The categories created are as follows: under
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$100M, $100M-$250M, $250M-$500M, $500M-$750M, $750M-$1B and $1B+. Table 5
summarizes the data set based on the new RIA firm categories.
Table 5: RIA AUM Descriptives

(A) RIA AUM
Category

(B) Number of
RIAs in
Population

(C) Number of
RIAs in Sample

(D) Clients in
population set

(E) Percentage
of clients (within
RIA AUM
category)
relative to
overall
population

<$100M
$100M-$250M
$250M-$500M
$500M-$750M
$750M-$1B
$1B+
Total

133
155
116
57
27
160
648

37
50
49
28
14
55
233

2,825
6,023
4,644
1,133
349
2904
17,878

16%
34%
26%
6%
2%
16%
100%

(F) Clients in
Sample Set

160
302
280
74
30
154
1,000

It should be noted that the clients in the sample set (column F) do not exactly match the
respective percentages in (column E) as the number of clients to include in the sample set were
determined from the service model classification outlined in Table 1.
III.2 Variables
Based on the research question, “are fee discounts associated with higher allocation of
client assets to an automated investment solution vs a traditional solution”, the dependent
variable for both hypotheses was the percentage of client assets allocated to a robo-solution. This
variable was calculated by taking the assets allocated to the robo-solution offered by the RIA
divided by the total assets the RIA manages for the client. Table 6 offers summary statistics for
assets managed by the RIA versus those allocated to a robo-solution from the sample set (see
Appendix A for further comparisons). The independent variables for the first set of hypotheses
(H1a-H1d) are RIA discretionary AUM, fee discounts (yes or no) and the percentage of
employees dedicated to the investment function. For the second hypotheses (H2a-H2e),
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independent variables are age, investment knowledge, investment goals, market decline
(participation in a 20% market correction) and actions taken if the client participated in a market
correction or what they would do if a 20% market correction occurred. For H2f, the independent
variables are account ownership type and taxability of the account (see Table 7 for descriptive
statistics). Independent variables are chosen with the goal of providing some direction to RIAs
on fee structure for a hybrid model and whether a client might be a good fit for a robo-solution.
Additionally, these variables (H2a-H2f) can be determined during the client on-boarding process.
Table 6: Continuous Variable Summary Statistics
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Table 7:Categorical Variable Summary Statistics
Table 7 reports summary statistics for the categorical variables of investment knowledge, investment goals, experience with
market declines, action taken if a market decline has been experienced or action that would be taken if a person were to
experience a market decline, account ownership and taxability. As mentioned in Table 4, variable descriptives, these categorical
variables are collected as clients enroll in a robo-solution.
Variable
Frequency
Percentage of Sample
Stated Investment Knowledge
None

130

13%

Some

550

55%

Good

241

24.1%

Extensive

79

7.9%

Build Long Term Wealth

293

29.3%

Build a rainy-day fund

13

1.3%

Generate income

33

3.3%

Prepare for Retirement

613

61.3%

Save for an upcoming expense

28

2.8%

Save for something special

20

2.0%

Yes

435

43.5%

No

565

56.5%

Stated Investment Goal

Experienced a Market Decline of 20% or more

Action Taken (If Yes to Decline)
Bought More

93

9.3%

Did Nothing

242

24.2%

Reallocated my investments

83

8.3%

Sold Some

12

1.2%

Sold Everything

5

0.50%

Action Taken (If No to Decline)
Buy More

86

8.6%

Do Nothing

218

21.8%

Reallocate my investments

229

22.9%

Sell Some

30

3.0%

Sell Everything

3

0.20%

Individual

930

93%

Joint

70

7%

Taxable

270

27%

Non-Taxable

730

73%

Ownership

Taxability

III.3 Analyses and Results
Robo-Advisor Assets-RIA AUM and Fee Discounts
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This study hypothesizes that RIA Discretionary AUM, employee specialization and if the
RIA firm offers a fee discount on a robo-solution should explain the cross-sectional variation in
the assets an investor allocates to a robo-solution (see hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c and H1d).
To understand how firm size, fee discounts and the percentage of employees performing
investment advisory functions (H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d) interact to explain the percentage of assets
held in a robo-solution, I conduct multivariate analysis by estimating the following models:
(1)

% assets in robo = b0 + b1AUMSize + b2FeeDiscount + b3AUMSize*Fee + e

(2)

% assets in robo = c0 + c1AUMSize + c2FeeDiscount + c3AUMSize*Fee + c4%age of
Advisory Employees + e

(3)

% assets in robo = d0 + d1SmallNoFee+ d2SmallFeeDiscount + d3LargeFeeDiscount + e
where % assets in robo represents the percentage of assets a client of the RIA holds in the

robo-solution in Models 1, 2 and 3. For Model 1, AUMSize represents the total discretionary
AUM of an RIA firm. If the RIA firm is under $250M, the indicator variable AUMSize takes on a
value of 1, and if the RIA firm is over $250M, AUMSize = 0. Fee Discount represents whether
the RIA firm offers a fee discount on the robo-solution, if yes then the indicator variable takes on
a value of 1, and if they do not offer a fee discount then the variable = 0. I also create an
interaction variable (represented by AUMSize*FeeDiscount) between AUMSize and whether the
RIA firm offers fee discounts (FeeDiscount) to capture the incremental effect of fee discount
over the RIA size on the percentage investment in robo-solution. For Model 2, the variables take
on the same values as in Model 1, with the addition of %age of Advisor Employees representing
the percentage of employees of an RIA firm that perform the investment advisory function. For
Model 3, SmallNoFee represents RIAs that are under $250M and do not offer a fee discount.
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SmallFeeDiscount represents RIAs that have under $250M in AUM and offer a fee discount and
LargeFeeDiscount represents RIAs that have over $250M in AUM and offer a fee discount.
The results from Models 1, 2 and 3 are reported in Table 8.
Table 8: Robo-Advisor Assets- RIA AUM and Fee Discounts
Table 8 reports the results of regressing the percentage of investor assets in a robo-solution on RIA Discretionary
AUM (AUMSize), fee discounts (FeeDiscount) and the interaction variable of AUM and fee discounts
(AUM*FeeDiscount) which is shown in Model 1. AUMSize equals 1 if RIA AUM is under $250M, and 0 if RIA AUM
is over $250M. FeeDiscount equals 1 if an RIA firm offers a fee discount, and 0 if it does not offer a fee discount.
AUM*FeeDiscount equals 1 if RIA AUM is under $250M and RIA firm offers a fee discount on its robo-solution, and
0 otherwise. These indicator variables take on the same values in Model 2. The additional indicator variable in Model
2 is %age of Advisory Employees, which represents the percentage of employees performing an investment advisory
role. For Model 3, SmallNoFee represents RIAs that are under $250M and do not offer a discount, SmallFeeDiscount
equals 1 if the RIA is under $250M and offers a fee discount, and 0 otherwise. LargeFeeDiscount equals 1 if the RIA
is over $250M and offers a fee discount, and 0 otherwise. The bottom panel provides the results of the pairwise
comparison tests for the mean coefficients in Model 3. p-values are reported in parentheses, *** indicates significance
level at 1%.

Model 1
Beta (p-value)
Constant

Model 2
Beta (p-value)

Model 3
Beta (p-value)
85.54
(0.001)***

-2.16 (.370)

82.85
(0.001)***
-2.73 (.270)

7.46 (0.001)***

7.49 (0.001)***

85.54 (0.001)***

AUMSize (Small/Large)
Fee Discount (Y/N)
%age of Advisory Employees
Interaction
(AUMSize*FeeDiscount)
SmallNoFee
SmallFeeDiscount (Y/N)
LargeFeeDiscount (Y/N)

.04 (.317)
-1.20 (.817)

0.02
R2
F Statistic
6.64 (0.001)***
No. of Obs.
1000
Test for linear combinations of coefficients
SmallNoFeeLargeFeeDiscount(Y/N)
F Statistic
SmallNoFeeSmallFeeDiscount(Y/N)
F Statistic
LargeFeeDiscount(Y/N)-SmallFeeDiscount(Y/N)
F Statistic

-1.10 (.831)
-2.16 (.370)
4.10 (.280)
7.46 (0.001)***
0.02
5.23 (0.001)***
1000

0.02
6.64 (0.001)***
1000

-9.62
15.27
(0.001)***
-6.26
1.74 (.188)
3.36
.54 (.464)
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I conduct preliminary analyses to ensure no violation of the assumption of
multicollinearity (see Appendix C), and none existed. The observations from the analysis in
Model 1 (shown in Table 8) indicate that clients of small RIA firms would hold 2.16% less in a
robo solution than a client associated with a larger RIA firm (over $250M). However, the
indicator variable, AUMSize, is not significant. This is somewhat of a surprising result based on
my observations as a consultant to the RIA Industry. Not surprising is that advisors offering a fee
discount would hold just over 7% more assets in a robo-solution. For clients associated with
smaller RIAs, the interaction of firm AUM and fee discounts, although statistically insignificant,
indicates that smaller firms offering a fee discount, clients would hold roughly 1% less in a robosolution. The F-statistic reported for Model 1 is statistically significant, which indicates
AUMSize, FeeDiscount and the interaction of AUMSize and FeeDiscount are reliable predictors
of the percentage of the assets held in a robo-solution. However, the low R2 indicates overall low
explanatory power of Model 1 in explaining the variation in the percentage of assets held in a
robo-solution.
For Model 2, I test if adding the percentage of employee performing an investment
advisory function (%age of Advisory Employees) to the model would increase the explanatory
power of the model. The results show that for every unit increase in the percentage of employees
performing the advisory function, the percentage of increase in a robo-solution is very minimal.
The F-statistic continues to be significant for Model 2. However, the overall explanatory power
of the model remains low (R2 = 2%).
In Models 1 and 2, the interaction variable, AUM*FeeDiscount, compares the percentage
of assets in a robo-solution between RIA firms that are less than $250 million and offer a fee
discount with all other RIA firms. Therefore, it does not allow pairwise comparison across RIA
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firms categorized on the basis of AUM and fee discount. Therefore, in Model 3, I refine the
specification, as mentioned previously, where SmallNoFee represents RIAs that are under
$250M in AUM and do not offer a fee discount, SmallFeeDiscount represents RIAs that are
under $250M in AUM and offer a fee discount, and LargeFeeDiscount represents RIAs that are
over $250M in AUM and offer a fee discount. Like in Models 1 and 2, for the association of RIA
size and fee discounts, an interaction variable (represented by SmallFeeDiscount and
LargeFeeDiscount) was created between the independent variable of RIA AUM and those RIAs
that offer fee discounts. To create the interaction variable, I separate RIA AUM into two
categories, AUM < $250M and AUM > $250M, both of which are indicator variables that take a
value of 1 if RIA AUM meets the criterion, and 0 otherwise. I create a third category, fee
discount, that consisted of whether the RIA offered a fee discount on their robo-solution offer,
with yes=1 and no=0. A fourth category was created, small fee category interaction
(SmallFeeDiscount), which is equal to 1 if the advisor offered a fee discount, and 0 if there is no
fee discount.
The results from Model 3 indicate that clients associated with a small RIA (under
$250M) that offers a fee discount would increase their percentage of assets held in a robosolution by 4.10%. However, this finding is not statistically significant. For clients associated
with large RIAs (over $250M), they increase their holdings by roughly 7.5%, this finding is
statistically significant. For Model 3, the F-statistic and R2 values remain similar to those for
Models 1 and 2. Pairwise comparison tests show that only the estimated coefficients on
SmallNoFee and LargeFeeDiscount are different from each other, which indicates that large
advisors offering a fee discount would attract a greater percentage of assets in a robo-solution
compared to the small advisors that do not offer a fee discount.
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To better understand these results, I isolate the independent variables of RIA
discretionary assets, and RIAs offering a fee discount. Table 9 shows these results. RIA AUM
was isolated as a continuous variable vs. a categorical variable as there is a possibility that
statistical power is reduced by dichotomizing the data for RIA AUM. In Table 9, Model 4
(DiscAUM) represents RIA AUM as a continuous variable. The results of regressing the
percentage of assets held in a robo solution against DiscAUM, indicates that for every dollar
increase in discretionary assets of an RIA, the assets held in a robo solution would actually
decrease. This regression shows no significance at conventional levels (p-value = 0.198) in
addition to the model having a low R2.
Comparing the previous analysis shown in Table 8, of RIA AUM (represented by
AUMSize) the results seem to suggest that non-linearity exists in the data as it relates to RIA
Discretionary AUM. As previously mentioned, the results shown in Table 8 for Model 1 and
Model 2 indicated an RIA firm over $250M would hold more assets (2.16% and 2.73%
respectively) in a robo-solution vs. an RIA firm under $250M. By changing RIA AUM to a
continuous variable, the results indicate an opposite relationship. The scatter plot in Figure 3
confirms that a nonlinear relationship exists in the data relating to RIA Discretionary AUM and
the percentage of assets held in a robo-solution. There is a large number of smaller RIAs under
$100M that hold a high percentage of assets in a robo-solution, however that percentage declines
up until approximately $10B at which time the percentage of assets held in a robo solution
begins to increase.
Given the nonlinear relationship of RIA AUM and the percentage of assets held in a
robo-solution, I estimate a quadratic regression by squaring the continuous variable for RIA
AUM. Results are shown in Model 5 in Table 9. The squared term confirms that as RIA firms
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grow larger, they will hold more in a robo-solution. Both DiscAUM and DiscAUM2 (Model 5),
are significant at the 1% level when I estimate a quadratic regression. However, explanatory
power continues to be low (R2 is 1%). Table 9 also shows RIA AUM (AUM < $250M) as a
categorical variable (Model 6) instead of using RIA AUM as a continuous variable. The
regression output shows significance at the 5% level (p-value = 2.7%), but still shows little
explanatory power (R2 is 0.4%). Finally, Model 7 shows the results of RIAs that offer a fee
discount. RIAs that offer a fee discount were coded as a 1 or 0, with 1 representing RIAs offering
a fee discount. The results show that offering a fee discount is significant at the 1% level (p-value
= 0.001). However, the contribution to explaining the variation in percentage of assets held in a
robo solution remains low, R2 = 2%.

Figure 3:Robo Advisor Percentage – RIA AUM Scatter Plot
Total Discretionary ADV Assets is scaled down by a factor of 1000.

Given that using a continuous variable, for RIA AUM, does not increase the explanatory
value of the regression model, I use the categorical approach as the data for this study was
segmented based on RIA AUM and some of the practitioner press is geared towards advisor
AUM segments.
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Referring to the models presented in Table 8, the models are significant at the 1% level
(p-value < .001) and based on these results H1b and H1c could be supported. However, there is
little support for H1a and H1d.
Table 9: Robo-Advisor Assets- RIA AUM
Table 9 reports the results of regressing the percentage of investor assets in a robo-solution on RIA’s Discretionary
AUM (DiscAUM), and Fee Discounts (FeeDiscount). DiscAUM and DiscAUM2 were scaled down by
DiscAUM/1000000 and DiscAUM2/10^20. Model 1 shows the results of DiscAUM independently as a continuous
variable. Model 2. combines DiscAUM and the quadratic variable DiscAUM2. Model 3 shows the results of isolating
RIA Firm AUM as a categorical variable (SmallCat). If an RIA has discretionary AUM of less than $250M, then the
variable is assigned a 1, otherwise 0. Model 4 shows the results of fee discounts (FeeDiscount) independently. pvalues are reported in parentheses, *** and ** indicates significance level at the 1% and 5% respectively.

% asset in robo
Variable

Variable Type

Intercept

Model
4

DiscAUM

Continuous

88.43 (0.001)***

Model
5

DiscAUM
DiscAUM2

Continuous

89.47 (0.001)***

Model
6

SmallCat

Categorical

89.025 (0.001)***

Model
7

FeeDiscount

Categorical

84.802 (0.001)***

Coefficient(s)
p-values are in parentheses

R2

No. of Obs

0.002

1,000

0.01

1,000

-4.589 (.027)**

0.004

1,000

7.837 (0.001)***

.02

1,000

-.000280 (.198)

Determinants of Robo Assets
This study also hypothesizes that an investor’s goals, age, knowledge, experience with
market corrections, action taken (or potential action taken) after a market decline, account
ownership type and account taxability are associated with the percentage and assets in a robosolution (see H2a-H2f). To test these hypotheses, I combined these variables to estimate the
following model:
(8) % assets in robo = e0 + e1Goals + e2Actions + e3Age + e4Knowlege+ e5MktDecline+
e6Taxability + e7Ownership + e
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where % assets in robo represents the percentage of assets a client of the RIA holds in the
robo-solution. Investor goals are the goals of the investor, which were segmented into two
categories consisting of long term and short term. Long-term goals (build long-term wealth and
prepare for retirement) = 1, and short-term goals (generate income, save for upcoming expenses,
and build a rainy-day fund for emergencies) = 0. Actions represented specific actions that
investors took if they experienced a market correction of 20% or more or potential actions an
investor would take if they have not experienced a market correction. If an investor either did
nothing or would do nothing, if a market correction were experienced, a value of 1 was assigned.
If an investor took any action or would take any action, which would include buying more, sell
some or all, or reallocating investments), a value of 0 was assigned. Client’s age were grouped
according to Pew Research10 and are associated with Gen Z (under 22), Millennials (23-38), Gen
X (39-54), Boomers (55-73), and Silent Generation (74-91). I assign the following values for
different age groups: Gen Z = 4, Millennials = 3, Gen X = 2, Boomers = 1 and Silent Generation
= 0. I also use Age as a continuous variable to determine if there is greater explanatory power,
and find no benefit to the analysis in doing so. Knowledge represents an investor’s knowledge
with an investor having no knowledge being assigned a code of 0, 1= some knowledge, 2= good
knowledge and 3= extensive knowledge. MktDecline represents if an investor has experienced a
market decline of 20% or more, with 0 = having experienced a market decline and 1 = having not
experienced a market decline. Taxability represents the tax effects of the account, where 1=
taxable and 0 = qualified (non-taxable). And finally, Ownership represents the account
ownership where 1 = individual ownership and 0 = joint ownership. I report the results from
regression (2) in Table 10.

10

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/.
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Table 10: Robo-Advisor Assets- Investor goals, actions, age, knowledge, and experience
with market corrections
Table 10 reports the results of regressing the percentage of investor assets in a robo-solution on investor Goals,
Actions, Age (using both categorical and continuous variables), investor Knowledge, MktDecline (experience with
market corrections of 20% or more), account Taxability and account Ownership. Investor goals were coded as long
term = 1. Long Term is defined as building long term wealth or preparing for retirement. Short term goals =0. Short
term goals were defined as generating income, saving for upcoming expenses, or building a rainy-day fund. Investor
actions are coded as did nothing or do nothing =1, all other actions =0. Age (categorical) is coded as Gen Z = 4,
Millennials = 3, Gen X = 2, Boomers = 1 and Silent Generation = 0. Knowledge was coded as none =0, 1= some, 2=
good and 3= extensive. Experiencing a market correction of 20% or more was coded as 0 and no experience with a
market correction coded as 1. For taxability, 1 represents accounts that are taxable, 0 represents IRAs and account
ownership, 1 = individual ownership and 0 = joint ownership. *** indicates significance level at 1% level.

% assets in robo
Constant

Goals

Actions

Age

Knowledge

Mkt
Decline

Taxability

Ownership

No.
of
obs.

R2

94.63
(0.001)***

-4.10
(.179)

2.68
(.142)

3.77
(0.001)***

-6.69
(0.001)***

1.32
(.518)

-3.32
(.138)

-3.65
(.341)

1000

.065

F
Statistic
10.01
(0.001)***

% assets in robo (age as continuous variable)
Age

Constant

-.282
(0.001)***

100.84
(0.001)***

No. of
obs.
1000

R2
.02

As in the previous model, I conduct a preliminary analysis for multicollinearity and find
it not to be the case (see Appendix C). Results from regression 8 explains slightly more of the
variable in assets held in a robo-solution (6.5%). The analysis did confirm what other studies
(Fan and Chatterjee, 2020; Woodyard and Grable, 2018; Cutler, 2015; Kirchenbauer and Jones,
2018) have found as it relates to younger investors’ adoption of robo-solution. The analysis
shows that Generation Z investors would hold 15% (gen z code of 4 x 3.77 % vs. silent
generation coding of 0) more of their investable assets in a robo solution than an investor in the
Silent Generation. The model also confirms that an investor’s knowledge can be used to predict
the level of adoption of a robo-solution. An investor with extensive knowledge would tend to
hold roughly 20% less in a robo-solution than an investor with no experience. Investor goals,
experience with market declines, actions taken with market declines, account taxability and
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ownership do not appear to make a significant contribution to the percentage of assets an
investor holds in a robo-solution. The model is significant at the 1% level (p-value < .001), and
based on these results, H2c and H2d could be supported. However, there is little support for H2a,
H2b, H2e and H2f. Table 11 summarizes the findings from H1a-H1d and H2a- H2f.
Table 11: Null Hypothesis Results
Table 11. shows a summary of the results for each hypothesis tested for H1 and H2. The description summarizes the
hypothesis along with the findings. Null Hypothesis represents the alternative conclusion to the hypothesis tested.
Fail to Reject represents a finding that the sample tested did not provide sufficient evidence of a relationship
between the dependent variable (percentage of assets in a robo-solution) and the independent variable. Reject
represents a finding that the sample tested did provide sufficient evidence a relationship exists between the
dependent and independent variable.
Reject or Fail
to Reject the
Null
Hypothesis

Hypothesis

Description

H1a

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with RIA AUM

Fail to Reject

H1b

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with offering Fee Discounts

Reject

H1c

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with interaction of AUM and Fee Discounts

H1d

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with percentage of employees performing investment
advisory function

Fail to Reject

H2a

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with an investor’s goals

Fail to Reject

H2b

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with an investor’s actions (or proposed actions) during a
market correction

Reject

Fail to Reject

H2c

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with an investor’s age

Reject

H2d

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with an investor’s knowledge

Reject

H2e

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with an investor’s experience with a market correction

Fail to Reject

H2f

Association of percentage of assets to a robo-solution
with account ownership and account taxability

Fail to Reject
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IV DISCUSSION
There have been many advances within the technology sector, or more specifically the
FinTech space, that are geared towards support of the growth trajectory in the RIA industry.
While robo-advisors have received their fair share of practitioner press, there has been little
research devoted to robo-advisor usage within the financial services industry. The difficult
challenge RIA firms face today is should they adopt a robo solution to help with capacity
constraints and once they decide to adopt, what would be the best pricing structure (Lopez et. al.,
2015) and who are the clients they should target for robo usage. Singh et al. (2017) state
advances in frontline interface technologies and devices are profoundly disrupting how
organizations and customers interact to create and exchange value. The concept of a hybrid
model (Sarpong, 2020; Thompson, 2018; Lopez et. al., 2015; Kitces et. Al., 2015; Stich, 2018)
brings forth the notion of how a robo-solution might complement the traditional service model of
RIAs. In keeping with the hybrid model framework, this research adds to current literature by
extending the focus beyond the individual investor level to the RIA level by assessing the effects
of fee discounts, RIA AUM and employee specialization on robo-adoption. Secondly, this study
extends the current research on the characteristics of individual adopters by considering factors
such as investor goals, experience with market declines and investment account attributes. These
contributions help RIA firms, seeking to either implement a hybrid model or increase current
adoption rates to manage client capacity, with evaluating a pricing structure for the robo-solution
and identification of client characteristics of likely robo adopters.
The first contribution, relating to RIA AUM and fee discounts, suggests that offering a
fee discount increases the adoption of a robo-solution but not when offered by an RIA under
$250M. Specifically, the findings show a large RIA firm offering a fee discount is a significant
contributor to the percentage of assets held in a robo solution. A client working with an RIA over

32

$250M would hold roughly 7.5% more in robo-solution vs. a client working with an RIA under
$250M. As previously mentioned, several practitioner papers (Lopez et. al., 2015, Ludden et. al.,
2015, Kitces et. al., 2015) pose the question of the proper pricing structure for a financial
planning firm offering a hybrid model. This study, to my knowledge, is the first to begin to
answer this question. Even though the findings suggest fee discounts increase adoption for larger
RIAs, there are other elements in the data from this study that should be taken into context.
First, referring to the work by Cyert and March (1963), prices are set based on
conventional practice. As previously highlighted (see Figure 2 on page 10), the range of pricing
for the top 10 robo-advisors was from 0 basis points to 89 basis points. Also, previously noted,
the typical RIA charges roughly 1% on their traditional services for clients. This study’s findings
suggest that RIAs might not follow conventional pricing practices when it comes to offering a
robo-solution. Figure 4 shows a 2x2 matrix of clients from this study linked to large RIAs that
offer a fee discount vs. clients linked to small RIAs that offer a fee discount. Only 39% (393 out
of 1,000 sampled) of the clients in this study are linked to an RIA that offer a fee discount. Table
5, on page 18, points out that 233 RIAs represented the 1,000 clients in this study which
indicates an RIA is represented more than once in the sample of clients. Of the 233 RIAs in the
sample, only 31% offer a fee discount. This low percentage of firms offering discounts could
speak to the notion that RIAs feel there is more value addition in their relationship with the
client, beyond just that of the investment solution they provide.
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Figure 4: Population RIA AUM-Fee Discount 2x2 Matrix

One possible explanation for fee discounts being significant in this study, specifically in
larger RIAs, could be found in Figure 5, which represents a 2x2 matrix of the 233 advisors in the
study. Of the large RIAs, 38% offer a fee discount vs. 19.5% of the small RIAs offering a fee
discount. Also, large RIAs (over $250M) represent 63% of the sample in this study. As
previously mentioned, from the 2020 Schwab Benchmarking Study, large RIAs serve a median
of 389 clients vs. small RIAs having a median client base of 132, which could account for the
high number of clients from the sample being associated with a large RIA. Another explanation,
as to why the findings suggest fee discounts are significant for larger RIAs, could be the pricing
strategy of these larger firms. Given larger RIA firms generate more revenue, than smaller firms,
they may have more flexibility in offering discounts and are able absorb these discounts more so
than smaller firms.
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Figure 5: Sample RIA AUM- Fee Discount 2x2 Matrix
One of the potential advantages of a hybrid model is the ability to leverage technology to
help manage client capacity, as mentioned in the introduction of this study. This study attempts
to add to the current literature by leveraging work done by Adam Smith (1965) on the division of
labor among workers. Specifically, this study argues that RIA firms under $250M do not have
specialized roles relating to investment management. The basis for this argument is from my
observations as a consultant to the RIA Industry having worked with RIA firms, ranging from
$50M up to $20B in AUM, for over 16 years. As shown in the results (Table 8), the independent
variable used to isolate employee specialization, %age of Advisory Employees, was not
significant. A potential factor causing the low significance is how RIAs report employee
specialization. As shown in Table 4, the RIA reports the total number of employees and the total
number of employees performing investment advisory functions on their ADV. A limiting factor
could be how “investment advisory” function is defined by the RIA. Investment advisory
function, could be interpreted to mean, solely focused on investment management or it could be
interpreted to be more of an “advisory” function that is client facing which could involve
advising clients on their investments. For example, consider a small RIA with 5 employees. Of
the 5 total employees, 1 employee is in a front office role and the other 4 are advisors that meet
with clients. This particular RIA could answer the question, on the ADV relating to investment
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advisory functions, as having 4 employees dedicated to the investment advisory role. For
comparison, a large RIA with 50 employees with 4 dedicated to specifically investments, could
answer the question as having 4 employees dedicated to investment advisory. This variation in
how the question is answered could lead to a low significance factor in the model. More research
would need to be done, at the advisor level, to isolate the variability in the data.
The second contribution of this study to the existing literature is to extend the research
done by Fan and Chatterjee (2020) by using the Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 1995)
to understand the investor characteristics of robo-adopters. One of the unique characteristics of
this study is the data consists of investors that have a chosen to work with an RIA firm and
therefore are looking to the RIA firm for investment guidance. Current literature has focused on
the “do-it-yourself” investor, and while some of the characteristics of a “do-it-yourself” investor
and an RIA might be similar as it relates to age, investment knowledge, or goals, this study adds
elements such as account attributes and experience with market declines to further help RIAs
refine the ideal client profile for robo-adoption.
This study, similar to other studies (Fan and Chatterjee, 2020; Fulk et. al; 2018;), finds
that age is a significant predictor of the percentage of assets held in a robo-solution. The results
show that Generation Z and Millennials would hold roughly 11% and 8% more, respectively, of
their investable assets in a robo solution than an investor in the Baby Boomer generation. The
willingness to embrace technology is one likely explanation for these findings. But, unlike their
parents who might have engaged a financial advisor, younger investors are less likely wanting a
face-to-face interaction and find the occasional validation of investment progress as sufficient in
a financial advisor relationship. Therefore, a robo-solution allows RIAs to manage capacity and
maintain a relationship with younger investors (typically children of older clients) which
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ultimately could help the RIA maintain the assets of their older clients as they pass to their
children. In keeping in line with age being associated with robo adoption, this study
hypothesized that there is an association with an investor goals and the percentage of assets held
in a robo-solution. Surprisingly, investor goals had little significance as it relates to roboadoption. A possible explanation for this finding is that investors do not place importance on the
type of investment solution or vehicle that helps them accomplish their goals, the importance lies
in the achievement of their goals.
I analyzed the client’s stated investment knowledge and the findings, while a significant
predictor in the model, were contrary to Fan and Chatterjee’s (2020) findings. The investor
knowledge (as described in Table 4) is collected as a subjective measure in the account opening
process. This study’s results show that an investor with extensive knowledge would hold 20%
less in a robo-solution than an investor with no investment knowledge. While this finding is
contrary to that of Fan and Chatterjee (2020), as part of their results, they state it is possible that
those who are more knowledgeable are more likely to prefer to work with a human advisor and
refrain from delegating their portfolio management to a robo-advisor platform. I would agree
with this assessment on the basis of a more knowledgeable investor is likely to be older (and as
previously stated less likely to adopt a robo-solution) and if they have hired an RIA, they are
more likely to want to have their investments “managed” by a human. D’Acunto and Rossi
(2019) state, in their discussion of the spectrum of robo-advisors, that a hybrid model caters to
wealthier and older clientele. They go on to state the importance of having a human advisor
involved in the elements of the client relationship that cannot be automated, such as financial
planning.
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For investors that have experienced a market correction, there is comfort in knowing they
have someone that is making decisions about how the correction impacts their financial situation.
This study also hypothesizes that there is an association with robo-adoption and an investor’s
experience with a market correction and also their actions (or proposed actions) during a market
correction. The notion behind these hypotheses is that for investors that have weathered a
market downturn, the image of a robo advisor at the helm of their portfolio would likely be a
tough sell for the RIA to their clients. The results show that neither experience with a market
correction or action taken make a significant contribution to the percentage of assets held on a
robo-solution. A possible explanation for this result lies in one of the limitations of this study. I
did not observe the interaction between the RIA and client, and I cannot attest to the approach
each RIA included in this study takes when recommending how they would serve each client.
There is an assumption that if the RIA proposes a robo-solution, the client makes a choice as to
whether to proceed with that recommendation or not. These results could be due to the trust
(Rossi and Utkus, 2020), regardless of any previous market experiences, a client places in the
RIA when they choose to hire the firm.
Two other variables included in the regression analysis are taxability and account
ownership. When it comes to managing taxes for investments, robo-advisors are an effective way
to manage tax implications as they employ passive investment strategies and apply rebalancing
techniques (Uhl and Rohner, 2018). Additionally, as a consultant to the RIA industry I can attest
to the fact that when RIAs have thought about how a robo-solution might fit their client’s needs,
typically the types of accounts that seem most appropriate are the accounts where parents set
aside money for college funds for their children, or investors that are just putting money away
for savings after maximizing any retirement accounts. As noted in Table 10, from the data set,

38

taxable accounts were coded as a 1, with IRA accounts coded as 0. Individual accounts were
coded as a 1 and joint accounts coded as a zero. The results show both taxability and account
ownership are not significant determinants of the adoption of a robo-solution.
Both regression models in this study had very low R2 values. As it relates to the models
associated with RIA AUM and fee discounts (R2 of 2%), there are a few potential explanations
for the low explanatory value. First, the robo-solution involved in this study has evolved since its
inception (and since the data sample was collected) and it is possible that this custodian’s initial
release of the robo-solution did not entice RIA firms to adopt the technology as part of their
offering. For example, lower trading costs or additions to investment solutions (such as adding
mutual funds) could have an impact on overall adoption that is not examined in this study.
Another possible explanation is the previously mentioned cash mandate by the custodian, which
the data was obtained from, that RIAs hold a certain amount of the model in cash. This mandate
could be viewed by some RIAs as having a negative effect on overall investment performance
(as they might hold less cash in their traditional portfolios) and therefore they might use other
model portfolio solutions for their clients. The model tested for client attributes also had a low
explanatory value (R2 of 6.5%). One possible explanation for this can be attributed to the
association of the client with an RIA in that the client has already decided to hire the RIA and
therefore has placed their decision making (as it relates to choosing a robo-solution) in the hands
of the RIA.
While neither model has great explanatory power, there are several implications for RIAs
that can be drawn from this study. First, this study sets out to answer the question: For assets
managed by an RIA, are fee discounts associated with higher allocation of client assets to an
automated investment solution vs. a traditional solution. While fee discounts were found to be
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significant in this study’s regression models, when evaluating these findings against the mean
assets held by clients in a robo solution, RIAs should not consider having to reduce their
traditional fees when adopting a hybrid model as a must. Certainly, there are robo-solutions in
the marketplace that are priced much less than the traditional fee structure of RIAs, but the
reduction in fees by the RIA appears to have a small overall impact to the percentage of assets
held in a robo-solution. Additionally, clients of RIAs might place more value in the overall
relationship and not focus as much on the fee as some RIAs might think. And secondly, the
hybrid model might offer a real opportunity for RIAs to engage the younger generation in an
effective way, given the results relating to age and investment experience. The engagement of
the younger generation could come in the form of the children of older clients or an opportunity
to grow a segment of the market.
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V

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

There are several limitations associated with the data used in this study. First, as
mentioned previously, the data set was collected from a single brokerage firm which poses a few
issues regarding the generalizability of the findings. While the brokerage firm does represent a
large population of RIAs, this study does not consider RIAs that are not using the firm’s
custodial services and potentially use other brokerage firm’s robo-solution. This limitation
introduces a potential selection bias within the data in that the firms included in the study have
already chosen to use a particular robo-solution and firms that offer a fee discount have already
made that choice. Second, as it relates to selection bias, there is an implication that the RIAs
included in this study have taken other robo-solutions into account in making the choice to use
this firm’s solution. That decision process is not within the scope of this study as it does not
review the merits of one robo-solution over another. Third, while the RIAs included in this study
have discretion over the investment process, the decision to adopt a robo-solution is not
specifically known as to how much influence the RIA had in actual adoption. Finally, this study
uses the Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DOF) to examine the characteristics of investors that
adopt a robo-solution. As, previously noted, DOF (Rogers, 1995) is used to explain how an idea
or product gains traction and spreads through a group or social system. Therefore, there is a timeseries element to DOF, in that it assumes the diffusion process is over a period of time. However,
this study does not use time-series data, and only considers a single point in time.
These limitations may offer several opportunities for future research. A more expansive
time-series study across multiple robo-platforms would provide greater insights into other
potential factors that might affect adoption such as investment solutions within a particular robosolution or the robo-solution interface itself. This study only focused on whether a fee discount
was offered or not, it did not consider the magnitude of the discount. The magnitude of the
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discount or whether the discount was applied could be a factor that could a part of future
research. As mentioned previously, the regression models in this study have very low
explanatory power. A possible explanation could be due to the decision-making process a client
goes through in hiring an RIA, they have made a decision to hire the RIA and therefore there
could be an implied trust in the recommendation of the RIA. A qualitative study could be done
across advisors and their clients to better understand the interaction between the RIA and the
clients regarding a robo-solution. An additional measure in this qualitative study could look at
the satisfaction level of the client as it relates to the hybrid used by the RIA. And finally, to
understand if a hybrid model truly helps with capacity constraints, within an RIA firm, a
longitudinal study could be done to measure firm performance relating to AUM growth, client
growth and retention rates and staff productivity measures.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
The bar chart below shows the comparison (by category) of client assets held in a robosolution vs. assets held with the RIA Firm.
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Appendix B
The Scatter Plot below shows the relationship between Percentage of Employees
Performing the Investment Advisory Function and Percentage of Assets held in a robo-solution.
Percentage of Employees Performing IA (Investment Advisory) Function is calculated by dividing
the number of employees an RIA reports that is performing an Investment Advisory role by the
total number of employees of the RIA.
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The scatter plot below shows the relationship between the percentage of assets held in a
robo-solution and age.
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Appendix C
Coefficients for Correlation and Multicollinearity
The tables below show correlation and collinearity statistics for the regression models
examined in this study. Correlation coefficients take on values between -1 and +1, indicating a
perfect correlation. Tolerance and Variance inflation indicator (VIF) values are shown to test for
correlation between independent variables (multicollinearity). Tolerance values less than .10
indicates that the multiple correlation with variables is high. VIF values above 10 would indicate
the presence of multicollinearity.
Correlations

Model 1

Collinearity Statistics

Zero-order

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

AUMSize

-0.070

-0.028

-0.028

0.729

1.371

FeeDiscount

0.135

0.114

0.114

0.784

1.276

AUMSize*FeeDiscount

0.013

-0.007

-0.007

0.731

1.368

Correlations

Model 2

Collinearity Statistics

Zero-order

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

AUMSize

-0.070

-0.035

-0.035

0.691

1.448

FeeDiscount

0.135

0.043

0.042

0.867

1.153

%of Advisory Employees

0.009

0.032

0.031

0.929

1.076

0.013

-0.007

-0.007

0.731

1.368

AUMSize*FeeDiscount

Correlations

Model 3

Collinearity Statistics

Zero-order

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

SmallNoFee

-0.081

-0.028

-0.028

0.831

1.203

SmallFeeDiscount

0.013

0.029

0.028

0.945

1.059

LargeFeeDiscount

0.133

0.114

0.114

0.821

1.218
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Correlations

Model 8

Collinearity Statistics

Zero-order

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

Goals

-0.024

-0.044

-0.043

0.950

1.053

Actions

0.060

0.047

0.046

0.918

1.089

Age

-0.147

-0.116

-0.113

0.794

1.260

Knowledge

-0.216

-0.175

-0.172

0.846

1.182

Mkt Decline

0.123

0.017

0.017

0.716

1.397

Taxability

-0.032

-0.046

-0.045

0.764

1.308

Ownership

0.006

-0.030

-0.029

0.789

1.267
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